how Scottish Water considers it necessary because of the connection referred to in point (a) of paragraph 2.  Reference was also made to the University of Stirling vs. Central Regional Council 1992, p.l.T. 79. It reaffirmed the principle that, under section 10(1) of the Water (Scotland) Act 1980, which suggested that a water authority should “compensate any person who has suffered harm as a result of the exercise of any of its powers … “, full compensation referring to “damage” which related to “injury” included, which, under customary law, represented countervailable injury. These authorities have shown that, in a case where statutory compensation has been sought, the normal common law rules relating to the cause of damage and the distance of injury are applied, unless otherwise provided for in the relevant law. However, it does not follow that the correct approach to the quantification of damages was consistent with common law principles. In this regard, reference was made to Wrotham Park Settled Estates/Hertsmere Borough Council. The facts, if any, have been set out in pps. 57 to 59 of the case. On page 60, it was decided that the amount of compensation in question was governed by the applicable legal provisions.
Under the provisions in question, there is no unlawful act; It was therefore necessary to review the status of the compensation guidelines.  With respect to the first chapter of the submission, the Chief Counsel first argued that the approach in section 20 of the 1968 Act had been misguided by the court, as is apparent from page 25 of the case. Second, the Tribunal should have concluded that, under Article 20, if one of the reasons for the damage suffered is paid in the exercise of legal powers, full reimbursement of that damage must be paid. Section 20 referred to “loss, injury or damage suffered by a person as a result of the exercise of any of his powers by authority”; Therefore, if the exercise of those powers constituted an essential or essential ground for the loss, that loss should be fully taken into account in the compensation. Third, it was argued that the General Court had respected a legal principle when it came to the conclusion that section 20 of the 1968 Act precluded a Stokes-type action against Cambridge, as it had found in pps. 29 and 30 of the above-mentioned case. Fourth, the Tribunal`s finding that the harm was not caused by the exercise of legal powers and that the loss was “too small”, given the facts, contradictory and untenable findings. In this context, reference would be made to pps.
22-24 of this case. The Tribunal should have concluded that, due to the exercise of legal powers, the requesting party had missed the opportunity to develop its own country or missed the opportunity to negotiate an element that would have offered a significant premium in the market, .b the value of the ransom, because there was no practical alternative to using such a roadmap to unlock the development value of the Guthrie Trust land. Fifth, the Tribunal did not recognize that the primary right to loss of opportunity, measured on the basis of development value, was the highest. The ransom note was measured in the same way. Sixth, the Court of First Instance was justified by the finding of point (o) of 2.18 concerning the grant of a Wayleave recognition payment. [F8(c) subject to a finding communicated in accordance with Section 3A, Subsection 2, of this Act, all private sewers [F9 and private systems SUD] related to [F5] to its sewers or treatment plants;  Looking at the Tribunal`s decision as a whole, there appeared to be three arguments; First, confidence in Kettering Borough Council v Anglian Water Services plc; second, Edwards was relied on against the Minister of Transport; and thirdly, it was based on what might be called transmission cases, decisions taken under section 1(4) of the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970. . .